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THE SAFETY BARRIER DILEMMA
"Ran-off-the-road" fatal accidents currently
account for approximately 65 percent of all freeway
fatalities (1). Accordingly, ever-increasing emphasis has
been given to the developmel)t of effective safety barrier
systems, from guardrails to earth berms to median
barriers to energy absorbing barriers and mires. However,
highway designers have also recognized that safety
barriers are hazards in themselves, misfits in the highway
environment, and that they are items to be eliminated
wherever possible. In a study of fatal accidents on the
Interstate Highway System, it was found that fixed
object collisions have been the leading source of
fatalities, accounting for 43 percent of the 1968-1969
fatal accidents (2). Ironically, guardrails were found to
be the most frequent objects struck first -- accounting
for 31 percent of the totaL Furthermore, this same
study estimates that, excluding non-interstate and
secondary urban roads, 6,300 miles of guardrail were
constructed on public roads in 1969. Statistics such as
these illustrate the risks facing today's drivers on the
Interstate Highway System. Until a major modification
is made that produces a siguificant reduction in such
risks, less mobility (through travel restrictions) will be
required to produce a significant reduction in fatalities
per year (3).
Safety barriers are a direct result of the adoption
of minimal design standards for our freeway systems.
Most highway designers realize that more liberal,
optimum designs would actually cost little more over
the life of a facility and would increase its useful life
span. Nevertheless, minimum design standards are
frequently the accepted criteria for the design of
highways. The reason given, ironically, is economy. A
mininum of expense is highly desirable; but the road
which is truly the cheapest is not the one which has
cost the least money, but the one which makes the most
profitable returns in proportion to the amount which
has been expended upon it (cf 4).
The purpose of any safety barrier is to reduce the
number of highway fatalities and to minimize personal
injuries. Also to be remembered is the order of emphasis
for service requirements: first to safety, second to
economics, and third to aesthetics (5 ). The highway
designer is faced with a choice between equally
unsatisfactory alternatives. He is faced with the safety
barrier dilemma. On one hand, he may select the more
economical, in the short term, minimal design which
always warrants the installation of myriads of safety
barriers; these items are conceded by most to be traffic
hazards in themselves. On the other hand, he may
choose optimum design standards with their higher
short~ term cost but lower, overalllongBterm cost arising

from the decrease in the number of accidents and
corresponding reductions in accident and maintenance
cpsts. In particular then, the highway designer may
.!protect" steep 2:1 sideslopes with guardrail; or he may
choose sldeslopes so flat (6: I, for example) that in most
instances they do not need to be "protected" ·by
guardrail. He may "protect" fixed objects with guardrail;
or he may provide a 30-foot clear zone in which all
objects are of frangible design. He may "protect"
median bridge_ piers with guardrails or earth berms; or
he may choose to eliminate median bridge piers entirely.
He may choose a narrow median requiring a median
barrier or simply choose a wide, 60- to 90-foot median.
Finally, he must decide between installation of
energy-absorbing barriers at hazardous gores or the
elimination of hazardous gores by contour grading.
A longitudinal barrier, such as guardrail and median
barriers, affords only a relative degree of protection to
vehicle occupants; a collision with this type of barrier
can result in a severe and possible compound accident.
Therefore, longitudinal barriers are warranted only at
locations where the severity of a collision with the
roadside feature or an opposing vehicle or of traversing
an embankment would be greater than a collision with
the safety barrier (5). Figure I illustrates a steep
sideslope "protected" with guardrail; and Figure 2
illustrates a fiatter sideslope without guardrail
11
prot.ection 11•
Embankment guardrail need has, in the past, been
determined on the basis of Figure 3 (6). However, the
results obtained from this figure are subject to
modification by considerations of cost, alignment, grade,
traffic volume, climate, and accident experience. The
curve is also subject to future change to reflect: I)
improved guardrail performance, 2) improved accident
cost computing methods, 3) variation in weights and
dimensions of future automobiles, and 4) improvements
to vehicle crashworthiness and "safety packaging" of
occupants (5 }. Giving due consideration to each of these
variables, the designer fmds himself in a dilemma. The
choice between guardrail and flatter embankments is not
so cut-and-dried when these other variables are
considered.
Other warranting features for guardrails are the
existence of fixed objects and non-traversable roadside
hazards. Nearly one-third of all highway fatalities occur
when vehicles leave the roadway and strike a roadside
obstacle (5 ). A study at the General Motors Proving
Ground (7) indicates that 80 percent of the vehicles
leaving the pavement did not travel more than 29 feet
from the edge of the pavement, as shown in Figure 4.
It is important to note that the roadside at the General
Motors Proving Ground has embankments with 10:1
slopes. The effectiveness of the magical 30-foot clear

zone where slopes are greater than 10:1 is suspect. Thus,
the designer who plans guardrail to "protect" 2:1 and
3: I slopes and who provides 30-foot clear zones (Figure
5) on these slopes is, insofar as safety is concerned,
inadequate at his job. By providing flatter side slopes,
although at greater initial construction cost, the designer
can in most cases eliminate the need for guardrail and
can provide a 30-foot (minimum) clear zone more
realistically capable of enabling errant drivers to return
their vehicles safely to the pavement. Intuitively, the
issue is not as simple as has been stated. The initial cost
of providing 5: 1 and flatter slopes at all but the highest
(60 foot and over) fill locations is often seen as
prohibitive. However, when the perhaps more theoretical
long-term cost, with its lower maintenance and accident
cost components, is considered, this option proves to
be a judicious choice. This is but another example of
the safety barrier dilemma facing highway designers
today.
The AASHO Traffic Safety Committee (1) has
recommended that where overpasses over divided
highways are being designed, two-span structures with
supports in the center of wide medians are generally
the optimum design. The merits of a single span
structure are even more obvious. Furthermore, the
"Yellow Book" states that the median piers necessitated
by the former design should, where close to the
roadway, be protected for the safety of the motorists,
The highway designer must choose the best safety
barrier for this critical task. The two barriers used most
commonly to "protect" median piers are guardrail and
earth berms. Neither alternative is completely
satisfactory, but a choice between the two must be
made. Double'beam guardrail with flared terminal
sections (Figure 6), although expensive, is currently
considered by most to be the optimum guardrail design
(1 ). A second alternative, though not as well
documented, is the use of earth berms (Figure 7) to
divert wayward vehicles from median bridge piers.
Furthermore, earth berms may be considered more
economical since most of the work involved in
constructing the mound can be done during
grade-and-drain construction using materials available on
location. In Ohio and West Virginia, the mound in the
median is virtually continuous for most sections where
it is employed. Maryland has mounds in the median
which extend 500 feet in both directions from bridge
piers. Illinois has experimented with earth berms on
either side of the approach near the pier but not around
the pier itself. A preliminary study of earth berms
conducted by the Kentucky Department of Highways
(8) concluded that, for low-speed encroachments, the
following improvements in mound design are justified

I)

2)

3)

4)

In order to mmumze ramping effects, the
mound should extend 500 feet in both
directions from the bridge piers.
The mound nose should be warped off-center
to present a greater rightward deflecting
surface and to lessen the tendency for vehicles
to become airborne and (or) mount the ridge
and descend on the wrong side.
The mound should transition from 3: I to 2: I
on the side slopes and also have an increasing
slope in the top of the mound as shown in
Figure 8.
The application of a wood-chip mulch to the
mound, thought by the investigators to
enhance the energy-absorbing characteristics
of the installation, should be deleted. The
energy-absorbing characteristics of plantings,
such as shrubs and flowering quince, were not

evaluated.
Further complicating the choice, as previously
mentioned, is the use of single-span structures with
30-foot clear shoulder zones ·- structures which
eliminate median bridge piers entirely, and which result
in increased bridge construction costs, ~s well as
decreased accident costs.
Historically, median barriers (Figure 9) have been
used to prevent across-the-median, head-on collisions
between automobiles in opposing traffic sireams.
Warrants for these barriers have been based on median
width and traffic volume as in Figure 10 (5). Except
on the basis of adverse accident experience, median
barriers have generally not been warranted if median
width exceeds 50 feet (Figure 11). However, headlight
glare research by Webster and Yeatman (9) concluded
that speeds would need to be limited to 40 mph with
the 6-foot lateral separations and 50 mph for the 33-,
72-, and 94-foot lateral separations in order to assure
adequate stopping sight distance to high-reflectance
targets under low beam conditions. The secondary
function of rigid median barriers as glare screens is
undeniable. Such findings tend to undermine the
confidence of those highway designers who have come
to consider the wider median types as the optimum
design. The dilemma once again is apparent. With due
consideration to right-of-way costs, barrier costs,
maintenance costs, and accident costs, which is the
better design: the wide (greater than 50 feet),
obstacle-free medians or the narrower (less than 50 feet)
medians with longitudinal barriers, which physically
separate opposing traffic streams and provide improved
nighttime visibility as well as reduced motorist
distraction during the daytime?

2

A final example may be found in the treatment
of roadside gore areas where the rate of accidents is
approximately four times as great as the rate of
"ran-off-the-road" aocidents at other locations (1).
There are two basic alternatives in providing adequate
safety at off-ramp gores which are not located on
structures. One is to keep the gore area and the area
beyond free of all hazardous obstructions so as to
provide a clear recovery area for out-of-control vehicles.
This entails the exclusive use of break-away signs, light
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Figure 1.

Figure 2.

Steep Sideslope "Protected" with Gull!'drail

Flat Sideslope without Guardrail.
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Figure 5.

Figure 6.

30-Foot Clear Zone.

Median Bridge l'iors "l'rotected" with Guardrail.
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Figure 7.

Median Bridge Piers "Protected" with Earth llenn.
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Earth Berm Design with Warped Nose and Variable Sideslopes.
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Figure H,

Figure 12,

Wide 60"Foot Median,

Elimination of Hazardous Gores by Contour Grading,

10

Figure 13.

Hi-Dro Cushion Type Impact Attenuator.

Figure 14.

Fitch Type Impact Attenuator.

II

Figure 15.

Steel Drum Type Impact Attenuator.
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NOTES:
tMinimum
Restricted Conditions -These dimensions approximately describe the space required for
installation of the current generation of crash cushion devices without encroachment on
shoulders and with the nose of the device offset slightly back of the parapet or ·shoulder line
However, there are designs already developed that would not fit in the space provided by
these dimensions. These dimensions are absolute minimums and should only be considered
where there are extremely tight geometric controls or where project plan development at the
time of the issuance of this memorandum is so far advanced that revising plans to get greater
space would be extremely disruptive to the highway program.
Unrestricted Conditions - These dimensions should be considered as the minimum for all
projects where plan development is not far advanced except for those site:? where it can be
shown that the increased cost for accommodating these dimensions, as opposed to those., for
Restricted Conditions, will be unreasonable.
(For example, if t\"l.e use of the greater dimensions would require the demolishing of an
expensive building or a considerable increase in construction costs then the lesser dimensions might be considered,)
tPreferred
These dimensions, which are considerably greater than required for the present generation
of Crash cushion devices, should also be considered optimum. There is no intention to imply
that·if space is provided in accordance with these dimensions that the space will be fully
occupied by a crash cushion device. The reason for proposing these dimensions is so that
if experience shows that devices should be designed for greater ranges of vehicle weights
and/or for lower deceleration forces there will be space available for installation of such
devices in the future. In the meantime, the unoccupied reserve crash cushion space will
provide valuable additional recovery area.

Figure 16.

Reserve Area for Off-Ramp Gores (5 ).
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